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Introduction
One of the main topics that has dominated policy
discussions all over Europe during the past months
has been the introduction of a bonus tax by the UK
and France. Given the widespread opinion that high
bonus payouts have fuelled excessive risk taking,
governments have tried to find ways of curtailing
this kind of incentive compensation.Thus,the British
Treasury announced at the beginning of December
2009 that it would impose a one-off ex-post 50 per-
cent levy on any discretionary bonuses exceeding
GBP 25,000 (EUR 28,000) awarded to employees of
banks for the period 9 December 2009 to 5 April
2010.Alistair Darling, the former British chancellor,
defended this measure by arguing that banks should
use their profits to strengthen their capital base
instead of paying high bonuses. On these grounds,
the proceeds from this bonus tax would be spent,
according to Darling, to refund taxpayers’ money
which was used for rescuing banks (Financial Times,
9 December 2009). The French Finance Minister
Christine Lagarde also announced that France would
levy a tax on bonuses exceeding EUR 27,500 in 2010.
Even the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland pro-
posed a bonus tax of 8.5 percent for bonuses exceed-
ing CHF 1 million as a response to excessively high
payments,whereas Greece even announced the intro-
duction of a 90 percent bonus tax.
The European Commission’s and the US’ stance on
dealing with excessively high bonuses is to some
extent different. The new EU rules to become effec-
tive as of 1 January 2011 envisage the deferral of be-
tween 40 and 60 percent of bonuses for three to five
years. Moreover, half of the upfront bonus payment
has to be paid in shares or in other securities linked to
the bank’s performance.As a result, the cash portion
of variable pay is limited to between 20 and 30 per-
cent (European Parliament 2010). In contrast the US
administration proposed the introduction of a cap of
USD 500,000 on the salaries and bonuses for execu-
tives of institutions that received federal assistance.
Moreover, as recently shown in a survey published
by the Institute of International Finance (2010) some
financial institutions have even initiated the restric-
tion of this kind of incentive compensation by offer-
ing fewer “guaranteed” pay packages or abolishing
“multi-year” guarantees which provided bank em-
ployees with fixed bonuses irrespective of their own
or the firm’s performance.
Still, given the lack of consensus on a uniform regula-
tory framework for dealing with this issue, banks in
more regulated countries are concerned that they
might suffer a comparative disadvantage relative to
their counterparts in less heavily regulated economies.
In general,whenever bonuses are a reasonable pro-
xy for the employee’s contribution to firm value, a
tax or a cap can reduce incentives and thus profits
to the detriment of the shareholders. Sometimes,
however, the bonus is based on an imperfect mea-
sure of the employee’s actual contribution to the
firm that does not depend only on effort but also on
luck. In firms where the measured performance is
more likely to reflect luck,a cap or even a tax might
be accordingly appropriate.
Under these circumstances, the question is whether
measures such as the bonus tax really achieve their
goals. The subsequent analysis shows that assuming
managers are highly mobile and have an outside
option not subject to a bonus tax, the compensation
contracts banks offer have to specify higher amounts
of gross effort-based pay.Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing to see that the bonus tax has not achieved its goal
of altering banks’ behaviour and is thus not the
appropriate instrument for dealing with this kind of
incentive compensation. * ETH Zürich, Kof, Switzerland.Bonus payments in different 
sectors and countries during the
last decade
To obtain a better idea of the size
of bonus payments, the following
graphs show the development of
bonus payments in different sec-
tors and countries.
Figure 1 depicts the trend in the
average bonus paid in different
sectors in over 63 countries. As
the graph shows, the peak was
reached in the sector “IT and
Hardware” during the stock mar-
ket bubble in 2000. During the
past years, the highest average
bonuses were paid in the sectors
“Banks” and “Speciality and Oth-
er Finance”(primarily investment
banks). Accordingly, in 2007, the
mean bonus paid in the sector
“Speciality and Other Finance”
amounted to around USD 1.5 mil-
lion and declined to around USD
0.8 million in 2008.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the devel-
opment of bonus payments in
banks and investment banks in
selected countries between 1998
and 2008. At first glance, it is
noticeable that bonus payments
paid by US investment banks
were much higher than those
paid by other banks or by their
counterparts in European coun-
tries.The bonus paid by a US in-
vestment bank even reached
USD 6 million in 1999 or USD 
4 million in 2006. The peak in
1999 in the US can be attributed
to the stock market bubble. Nev-
ertheless, bonuses paid by banks
and investment banks in France
and England also display a rising
trend. Accordingly, the average
bonus paid by an investment bank
even tripled from around 300,000
USD to above USD 1 million in
England and France between
2002/2003 and 2007/2008.
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These extremely high incentive payments are mostly
linked to current period accounting profits, and the
widespread opinion is that high bonus payouts
fuelled excessive risk taking in the financial sector.
Under these circumstances, we should be interested
in considering the possible consequences of mea-
sures which aim at restricting the level and structure
of these compensation components, especially since
top executives have very high incomes. How they
respond to changes in taxes may have important effi-
ciency and revenue effects.
Implications of the bonus tax
To analyse the possible implications of a bonus tax,
consider the following thought experiment. Suppose
a firm operates in two different economies and
employs a manager in each of them to run the firm’s
operations in the respective country.I use the Princi-
pal Agent model, which assumes compensation con-
sists of two distinct components:the first one is inde-
pendent of effort whereas the second one is effort
sensitive. Applying such a framework one can com-
pute the optimal compensation components in each
of the two countries and then consider the effects of
the introduction of a bonus tax in one of the two
economies.
Let us assume furthermore that net-of-tax wages have
to be equalised between countries and that managers
face the same reservation wage (i.e., they have the
same outside option).Under these circumstances,net-
of-tax effort-based compensation in the country
introducing the tax equals the effort-based compen-
sation component in the other country.1 Thus, given
the higher gross effort-based compensation, the opti-
mal contracts are tilted towards more effort-based
pay. To put it differently, the bonus tax reduces the
risk cost to the manager from any performance-based
contract and weakens the effort-inducing incentives
of such a contract.The two effects combined encour-
age the firm to offer stronger effort incentives.A pre-
liminary look at compensation ratios2 in the UK con-
firms this result as these ratios stayed constant or
even increased compared to previous periods with no
bonus tax.Therefore, the predicted theoretical results
are confirmed by the banks’ reaction: They did not
reduce the compensation paid to managers but rather
increased it. Thus the bonus tax did not achieve its
purpose of altering bankers’ behaviour.
In addition, the introduction of such a tax reduces
firm profits and thus dividends. Why is that so? As
the tax negatively affects compensation and thus
effort,the firm needs to increase the manager’s com-
pensation to induce her to exert more effort.There-
fore, firm profits are negatively affected and the tax
incidence basically falls upon the firm’s sharehold-
ers.This result is in line with the intentions of Deut-
sche Bank or Credit Suisse to lower dividend pay-
outs as a response to the introduction of the UK
bonus tax (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 De-
cember 2009).
Let me now turn to the welfare implications of such
a policy for the different economies. For this pur-
pose, it is necessary to distinguish between two main
scenarios: a first one in which managers cannot be
relocated between countries and a second one in
which relocation is possible.
No relocation possibility
Let us now pursue our thought experiment further
and assume the bank needs to employ a manager at
each location and operations cannot be moved to
no-tax countries. In this situation, the country that
abstains from introducing such a tax might be at a
disadvantage, because the dividend income accruing
to its residents will decline.
The welfare implications for the country imposing
the tax depend on the relationship between the pos-
itive tax revenue effect and the negative dividend in-
come effect. Assuming that the so-called home bias
holds, the country where the majority of the firm’s
shareholders reside will be affected most by the re-
duction in profit distributions.3
Relocation possibilities exist
A different situation arises if it is assumed that the firm
has the possibility to relocate managers between coun-
1 Contrary to the statement of Josef Ackermann (Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, 19 December 2009), if the bonus tax is introduced
ex ante, it is not possible to lower bonus payments in the no-tax
economy since the manager’s participation constraint would be
violated. Such a policy is only viable if the tax is a one time ex post
levy.
2 Compensation ratios are defined as the ratio of total compensa-
tion to firm revenues.
3 Assuming for instance Deutsche Bank shares are held primarily
by German citizens, German shareholders would lose more than
UK counterparts as a result of lower Deutsche Bank profit distrib-
utions.tries as a response to a change in the bonus tax. This
assumption is in line with the reaction of the majority
of financial institutions – such as Goldman Sachs, So-
ciété Générale, BNP Parisbas, HCBC or JP Morgen –
which threatened to transfer operations out of the
UK. In this new scenario, the welfare implications
change as compared to the case with no relocation.
On the one hand,the country introducing the tax now
loses more in welfare terms since the possibility to re-
locate managers negatively affects both labour in-
come tax revenue and revenue from the bonus tax.
On the other hand, the country that abstains from in-
troducing a bonus tax might even gain in welfare terms
if the positive labour income tax revenue effect gener-
ated by the relocation of managers exceeds the nega-
tive dividend income effect.
Additional aspects of the different reform proposals
The new EU rules,as mentioned in the Introduction,
provide for half of the upfront bonus payment to be
paid in shares or other securities. Keeping in mind
that bonuses as incentive compensation depend on
accounting profits whereas shares and options as
incentive devices are linked to the firm’s market val-
uation, the Commission’s proposal ceteris paribus
overemphasises market valuation as a measure of
firm performance.Accordingly, such a measure may
induce bank managers to take actions which increase
the bank’s stock price.
The alternative instrument for dealing with high
bonuses which is being discussed in the US – the bo-
nus cap – is similar to a price cap for a monopolist.It
requires the government to know the “optimal” size
of the bonus and set the cap at this level,an informa-
tion that is not required for a bonus tax.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis shows that the bonus tax did
not really achieve its purpose. If it is assumed that
managers in the financial sector are highly mobile
and the supply of managers is very elastic, the inci-
dence of the bonus tax falls on the banks’ sharehold-
ers.It is thus not surprising that the bonus tax did not
succeed in changing the banks’ behaviour of dealing
with excessive bonuses which fuel risk taking.There-
fore, the question still remains what can be done to
deal with this kind of incentive pay.To induce man-
agers to take a longer term perspective instead of
focusing on short-term risky projects, compensation
packages have to be linked to the firm’s performance
over a multi-year period, as is already the case for
options with long vesting periods. In light of these
arguments,the new EU proposals are a step forward
since under the new rules a fraction of the bonus
payout is deferred for several years.
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